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prices? As it stands, the theorem provides an
important benchmark and enforces careful
thinking about financial markets’ workings and
the imperfections that would create a world
where a firm’s financial position (hence equity
prices) affects its ability to engage in production.
Many possible imperfections could generate
such a world. This article focuses on failures of
information. Suppose that only the entrepreneur
knows every detail of the proposed project,
while outside investors financing the project
have no way of knowing exactly what the
entrepreneur would do with their funds. Sup-
pose further that outside investors have limited
ability to punish an entrepreneur who runs
off with their money or squanders it on a mis-
guided production activity. In this scenario,
external investors are likely to provide financ-
ing only if they know they will be able to
Introduction
In a world with perfect capital markets (the
world of the Modigliani–Miller theorem), a
firm’s financial position—that is, its debt versus
its equity level—is irrelevant to its decisions on
production and investment. The reason is that
perfect capital markets let information flow
freely. If an entrepreneur has a good idea for 
a new product, she will be able to produce it
regardless of her personal financial position
because outside investors, well informed and
readily perceiving an attractive profit opportunity,
will provide whatever financing is needed.
The supposition that an entrepreneur’s
financial position is irrelevant has important
implications for monetary policy. A worthy
production activity will be funded whatever
the entrepreneur’s finances may be. Therefore,
monetary policy need not respond to asset
prices.1 The Modigliani–Miller theorem, how-
ever, is not necessarily meant to be a descrip-
tion of reality. On the contrary, a voluminous
empirical literature supplies evidence that a
firm’s financial position does affect its ability 
to operate. But does this departure from the
Modigliani–Miller theorem provide a rationale
for basing monetary policy partly on equity
  1 A response might be warranted if equity prices help forecast
macro variables of interest such as output and inflation.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 2001 Q452
recoup their investment if the project turns
sour. One way to ensure this is to restrict the
amount of funds they provide to the size of
the entrepreneur’s financial position. That is,
external financing will be no greater than the
collateral that investors can seize after the fact.
We have just summarized a story in which a
firm’s financial position, which we will hence-
forth call “collateral” or “net worth,” has a
powerful effect on a its ability to produce.
Increases in its equity price will increase this
collateral—and with it a firm’s ability to pro-
duce. Clearly, this is no Modigliani–Miller
world, but what role does monetary policy
have in it? Can policy help the economy
respond to the fundamental shocks that buffet
it? Should policy respond to asset prices in
such a world?
This article uses a theoretical model to
address these questions. The model is highly
stylized to keep the analysis tractable, but its
essential point will survive more complicated
modeling environments.2 A key conclusion is
that there is a role for activist monetary policy.
Imperfect information imposes a collateral
constraint on this economy, and monetary
policy can be useful in alleviating this con-
straint by responding to productivity shocks 
or exogenous changes in equity prices.
I. The Model
The theoretical model consists of households
and entrepreneurs. We will discuss the deci-
sion problems of each in turn.
Households
Households are infinitely lived, discounting the
future at rate β. Their period-by-period utility
function is given by
1 1+τ Lt (1)    U(ct,Lt)   ct –,
1
1+τ
where ct denotes consumption and Lt denotes
work effort.  We choose this form for conve-
nience. Each period, the household decides
how much to work at a real wage of wt. The
resulting labor supply relationship is given by
τ
wt (2)    Lt =.  Rt 
Notice that labor supply responds positively to
the real wage with elasticity τ. Rt denotes the
gross nominal interest rate. Labor supply is
negatively related to the nominal rate because
we assume that households must use cash to
facilitate their consumption purchases (a “cash-
in-advance constraint”).3 Because the opportu-
nity cost of holding cash is given by the gross
nominal rate, higher nominal rates make it
more difficult to turn labor income into con-
sumption, thus discouraging labor supply. To
put it another way, the gross nominal interest 
rate acts like a wage tax where 1 = (1–tw). The
Rt
celebrated “Friedman rule”—that the net nomi-
nal interest rate should be zero (orR=1)—is
based directly on the observation that a zero
interest rate eliminates this implicit wage tax.4
A household must also make a decision
about consumption versus saving. Households
can save only by acquiring shares to a real
asset that pays out (real) dividends of Dt con-
sumption goods at the end of timet. It is help-
ful to think of this as an apple tree that pro-
duces Dt apples in time t. The tree trades at
share price qt at the beginning of the period
(before the time-t dividend is paid). Under our
assumption on household preferences, the
equilibrium real share price is given by divi-
dends’ present discounted value (the assump-
tion of linear utility implies that the discount
rate on dividends is the constant β) 
–  
(3)   qt =Et   βjDt+j .
j=0
  2 For example, empirical evidence suggests that collateral 
constraints have a stronger effect on small firms than on large ones
(see Gertler and Gilchrist [1999]). We abstract from this heterogeneity
and posit a single representative firm. Future efforts to quantify collateral
effects should model heterogeneity more explicitly.
  3 See the appendix for a precise statement of the household’s
problem and the resulting first-order conditions.
  4 In our model, the first-best policy will be the Friedman rule.
Our policy section includes analysis of a second-best problem where, for
some unspecified reason, the monetary authority desires to keep the
long-run average interest rate above zero, R>1.
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– If the share price were below this level (qt<qt),
then household demand for shares would be
infinite; if the share price were above this level
– (qt >qt), then household demand for shares 
would be negative infinity, that is, a desire to
sell short. Thus, households will hold a finite 
– and positive level of tree shares only if qt is 
the equilibrium price. The dividend process
is given by
Dt+1=( 1–ρD) Dss + ρD Dt + εD
t+1.
The symbol Et denotes the rational forecast of
future dividends; recall also that β is the rate of
household time preference, which is also the
real interest rate in this environment. Notice
that the asset price depends only on the
exogenous dividend process and that the
share price is increasing in the current and
future dividend levels. The exogenous dis-
count process is an AR1, which means that
next period’s dividend is a weighted average
of today’s dividend (Dt) and the long-run




Entrepreneurs too are infinitely lived and have
linear preferences over consumption. They are
distinct from households in that they use a
constant-returns-to-scale production technology
in which labor produces consumption goods 
(4)    yt =AtHt ,
where At is the current level of productivity,
and Ht denotes the number of workers
employed at real wage wt. Like dividends




The entrepreneur is constrained by a
borrowing limit. In particular, she must be able
to cover her entire wage bill with collateral
accumulated in advance. We will denote this
collateral as nt (net worth). The loan constraint
is thus
(5)    wtHt ≤nt .
Notice that all variables are in real terms. 
Why is the firm so constrained? Many
possible information stories would motivate
such a constraint. We will assume the classic
hold-up problem: Suppose that hired workers
first supply their labor input but that output is
subsequently produced if and only if the entre-
preneur contributes her unique human capital
to the process. This production sequence
implies that the entrepreneur could force
workers to accept lower wages ex post; other-
wise, nothing would be produced. Workers,
anticipating this hold-up possibility, will take
steps to prevent it. This is harder than it
sounds. For example, an equity-type arrange-
ment in which worker and entrepreneur agree
ex ante to split the production ex post will not
work. After the worker has supplied his labor,
the entrepreneur can refuse to provide her
unique human capital unless the worker’s
share is made arbitrarily small. In that case, the
worker’s only choices are to accept this small
share or to take nothing. The worker could
seize the entrepreneur’s existing assets, but
then we are back to our collateral constraint.
In fact, as Hart and Moore (1994) and Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) demonstrate, these hold-up
problems can only be avoided completely if
the entire wage bill is covered by existing
collateral that workers could seize in case
of default.5
We can easily enrich this story by assuming
the existence of financial institutions that inter-
mediate between workers and entrepreneurs.
For example, suppose that such intermediaries
provide within-period financing to entrepre-
neurs, who use it to pay workers. An interme-
diary, however, is concerned about the hold-up
problem, so it limits its lending to the firm’s
net worth. This returns us to the collateral
constraint described in equation (5).6
We assume in what follows that the loan
constraint is binding, so that labor demand is
given by
nt (6)    Ht =.  wt 
Notice that labor demand varies inversely
(with a unit elasticity) to the real wage but is
positively affected by the level of net worth.
Firms that have more collateral can employ
  5 This implicitly assumes a one-period problem so that an
entrepreneur who withholds her labor cannot be punished by being
deprived of future income.
  6 Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) use a similar constraint. See Hart
and Moore (1994) for more discussion of the hold-up problem.
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more workers because hold-up problems are
less severe. The binding collateral constraint
implies that At>wt, that is, the firm would like
to hire more workers but is collateral-
constrained. 
An entrepreneur’s only source of net worth
is previously acquired ownership of apple
trees. If we let et–1 denote the number of tree
shares acquired at the beginning of time t–1,
then net worth at time t is given by
(7)   nt = et–1qt ,
so that the loan constraint is given by
(8)   wtHt ≤ et–1qt .
As noted above, the assumption of a binding
loan constraint implies that the firm’s marginal
profits per worker employed are (At –wt).
These profits motivate the entrepreneur to
acquire more net worth. We will need to limit
this accumulation tendency so that collateral
remains relevant. The entrepreneur’s budget
constraint is given by
(9)    ce
t +et qt =et–1qt +et Dt +Ht (At –wt).
The right side of the budget constraint
equation is the entrepreneur’s income in
period t, which consists of her revenue from
the sale of existing trees (et–1qt), dividends
from new tree purchases (etDt), and profits 
(Ht[At –wt]). The left side represents her
potential purchases in period t. With her rev-
enue, she purchases either consumption (ce
t )
or new tree shares (etqt). Using the binding
loan constraint, we can rewrite this as
At (10)  c e
t +et (qt –Dt) =et–1qt wt 
,
Because of the profit opportunities from net
worth (At>wt), the entrepreneur would like to
accumulate trees until the constraint no longer
binds (trees are more valuable to collateral-
constrained entrepreneurs than they are to
households). To prevent this, we will assume
that entrepreneurs must consume a fraction of
their net income each period
At (11)  ct
e=(1– )et–1qt wt  
,  
so that entrepreneurial tree holdings evolve as
At (12)  et (qt –Dt) = et–1qt wt 
.
Below we will choose  <1 to offset the
high return to internal funds, thus keeping the
entrepreneur’s collateral constrained in equilib-
rium. This forced-consumption-savings decision
implies that households will price trees so that
in equilibrium qt = – qt .
Equilibrium
In this theoretical model, there are two active
markets, the market for apple trees and the
labor market (the money market and bond
market are discussed in the appendix). We
normalize the supply of tree shares to unity so
that the asset market clears with et+st =1. The
equilibrium tree price is given by (3). As for
the labor market, equating labor supply with






The equilibrium real wage is increasing in
net worth because higher net worth increases
labor demand. The wage is also increasing in
the nominal interest rate because a higher
nominal rate decreases labor supply. Equilib-
rium employment is given by
τ
nt 1+τ
(14)   Lt =.    Rt 
For the reasons already noted, employment
responds positively to net worth and nega-
tively to the nominal rate.
Log-Linearizing the
Model
Because the model is relatively simple, it is
convenient to express the equilibrium in terms
of log deviations. In what follows, the ~ 
represents a percent deviation from the
steady state.
~ τ ~ ~ (15)   Lt=  (nt–Rt)
1+τ
~~ ~ (16)   nt=qt+et–1
~ τ ~ ~ ~ (17)   Etnt+1=  (nt–Rt)+At,
1+τ
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price (3). Using (16) to eliminate nt, we can
rewrite (15) and (17) in terms of et as
~ τ ~~ ~
(18)   Lt =  (qt+et–1–Rt )
1+τ
~ τ ~ ~ ~ τ ~ (19)   et =  (et–1–Rt)+At+ – ρD qt .
1+τ  1+τ  
To calculate (19), we have also used the ability
to express the share price (3) as
~ ~ 1 – β
(20)  qt =Dt ,  1–βρD 
where ρD is the autocorrelation in the dividend
process. To sum up, the model consists of equa-
tions (18)–(20). There is one predetermined
variable, et–1, and there are three exogenous
shocks: At, Dt, and Rt.
II. The Experiments
Before turning to the question of monetary
policy, it is useful to sharpen one’s economic
intuition about the model by considering
several experiments.
First Experiment: 
A Shock to 
Productivity (At)
Suppose that we hold all other variables con-
stant and consider only shocks to productivity.
Then we have
~ τ ~ (21)  Lt = et–1 1+τ
~ τ ~ ~ (22)  et=  et–1+At . 1+τ
By combining, we obtain
~ τ ~~ (23)  Lt+1=  (Lt+At).
1+τ
Notice that contemporaneous employment
does not respond to shocks to productivity,At
(see [21]). This is a manifestation of the collat-
eral constraint. When productivity is high, the
firm would like to expand employment but it
cannot because it must finance current activity
55
with current collateral. Thus, the collateral
constraint limits the firm’s ability to respond
to shocks.
There is, however, a delayed response. 
A positive shock to At has no effect on current
employment, but it increases et and, through
it, tomorrow’s net worth (see [22]). Hence,
employment responds with a lag to produc-
tivity shocks.
This lagged response generates persistence
to a temporary shock. That is, even if the
shock to At lasts only one period, the effect
on employment, Lt, and thus on output, lasts
much longer and only dies out at the rate
given by τ/(1+τ). If the shock to productivity is
serially correlated, this effect remains, so that
the collateral constraint prolongs the effect of
the productivity shock.
Second Experiment:
A Shock to 
Dividends
Proceeding as before, we have:
~ τ ~ τ 1 – β ~ (24)  Lt = et –1 + Dt 1+τ  1+τ   1–βρD 
~ τ ~ τ 1 – β ~ (25)  et = et –1 + Dt.
1+τ  1+τ 
–ρ   1–βρD 
By combining, we obtain




t is the innovation in the dividend
process. The most remarkable observation is
that employment responds positively to dividend
shocks, even though these shocks have no
effect on either worker productivity or labor
supply. Instead, dividends affect employment
solely through the collateral constraint. Because
trees are used as collateral, and a dividend
shock drives up their price, the collateral
constraint is relaxed and the firm can expand
employment. Once again, these effects are
highly persistent.
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A Monetary 
Policy Shock
We will assume that monetary policy is given
by directives for the gross nominal interest
rate, Rt. The implied path for the money supply
can be backed out of the money demand
relationship (see the appendix).
Proceeding as before, we have 
~ τ ~ ~ (26)   Lt =  (et –1–Rt )
1+τ
~ τ ~ ~ (27)   et =  (et –1–Rt ).
1+τ
By combining, we obtain
~ τ ~~ (28)   Lt =  (Lt –1–Rt ).
1+τ
There are two differences between the interest
rate shock and the productivity shock. First,
the interest rate shock has an immediate effect
on employment because it alters labor supply
contemporaneously. Second, its effect is nega-
tive because the higher interest rate lowers the
households’ desire to work. As in the previous





What is the nominal interest rate’s optimal
response to productivity and dividend shocks?
To answer such a question, we need a welfare
criterion. The most natural choice in the pre-
sent context is the sum of household and
entrepreneurial utility, which is given by
11 1+– 1+–
ττ Lt Lt (29)  V t  ct + ct
e – =  At Lt+D t – ,
11
1+ 1+ ττ
where the equality follows from the fact that
total time-t consumption must equal the total
supply of time-t consumption goods, which
comes from the goods produced using the
entrepreneur’s production technology, and
dividends produced by the apple tree. The
only choice variable in V t is employment.
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Maximizing V t with respect to Lt yields the
optimality condition
(30)  Lt = At
τ.
We will call this solution the “first-best” out-
come because the welfare criterion can go no
higher. The first-best has two natural features.
First, employment responds positively to pro-
ductivity shocks. When productivity is high, it
is efficient for employment to respond posi-
tively. Second, the first-best employment does
not respond to dividend or share prices. The
welfare criterion V t is increasing in Dt, but
these shocks have no effect on labor produc-
tivity; thus, it is efficient for employment not to
respond to these shocks.
Is the first-best achievable? If there were no
collateral constraint, we would have wt =At,
and the first-best could be achieved by setting
Rt =1, that is, by setting the net nominal rate to
zero. This is the celebrated Friedman rule. It
is optimal in this model because the cash-in-
advance constraint on consumption distorts the
labor margin.  
But in a world with agency costs, the first-
best is impossible because employment is
given by (14), which, as noted above, is
rendered too low (At>wt) by the collateral
constraint. Furthermore, according to (14),
employment fluctuates with net worth and not
with the level of productivity. Compared to the
first-best outcome, these employment responses
are dreadful. Contemporaneous employment
does not respond to productivity, even though
it is efficient to do so; employment, however,
does respond to share prices which, in an
efficient world, should not affect it. In short, the
collateral constraint causes the economy to
under-respond to productivity shocks and to
over-respond to dividend shocks.
The advantage of the Friedman rule is that 
it minimizes the distortion on labor from the
cash-in-advance-constraint.7 The disadvantage
is that a pegged zero nominal interest rate pre-
cludes the monetary authority’s responding to
shocks to make employment respond effi-
ciently. It turns out that the benefit of a lower
nominal interest rate always wins out in this
  7 Recall that because cash must be held to facilitate transactions,
higher nominal rates discourage labor supply in (2).
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environment—the first-best policy is simply to
set the nominal interest rate to zero (that is,
R=1) and leave it there. But what happens if
the monetary authority does not set the long-run
interest rate to zero but keeps it positive for
some unspecified reason?8 Can monetary
policy improve on this economy’s ability to
respond to shocks in this world? Yes. To illus-
trate, let us consider a second-best exercise.
Optimal Policy in
Log Deviations
We take the steady state of the economy as
given and use monetary policy so that the
economy responds to shocks efficiently.
Optimal employment (in log deviations) is
given by 
~~ (35)   Lt = τAt .
To find the optimal (second-best) interest rate
policy, we can impose equation (35) in the
system (18)–(19), and back out the implied
interest rate. This exercise yields
~ ~~ ~ (36)   Rt=qt+e t–1 –(1+τ)At
~ ~ ~ (37)   et =(1 +τ)At –ρDqt .
By combining, we obtain
~~ Rt =εt
D –(1+τ) [εt
A+(ρ A –1)At –1].
What are the properties of this (second-
best) optimal monetary policy?9 When there is
a positive shock to productivity At, the central
bank should lower the nominal interest rate
so that employment can expand efficiently.
A constant-interest-rate policy does not allow
this because of the collateral constraint, but a
procyclical interest rate policy overcomes the
collateral constraint and allows the economy to
respond appropriately.
Suppose that productivity shocks are
autocorrelated with coefficient ρ A. A positive
technology shock of 1 percent calls for an
immediate interest rate decline of (1+τ) percent,
but then an increase to (1+τ)(1–ρ A). The
increase is needed to prevent over-expansion
of employment, because net worth rises with
the initial interest rate decline.
In contrast, if there is a shock to share
prices that drives up net worth, nt, the central
bank should increase the interest rate enough
to keep employment constant. It is inefficient
for employment to respond to these dividend
shocks, and the central bank can ensure no
response by raising the nominal rate in response.
Notice, however, that even if a shock to share
prices (dividends) is autocorrelated (ρD>0),
the optimal interest rate response is iid.
IV. Conclusion
This article addresses the question of how
monetary policy should be conducted in a
world where asset prices affect real activity
directly because of binding collateral
constraints, that is, a world in which the
Modigliani–Miller theorem does not hold.
How should monetary policy be conducted 
in such a world? Should it respond to asset
prices? How should it respond to productivity
movements? In this environment, there is a
welfare-improving role for a monetary policy
that responds actively to asset price and
productivity shocks. This activist interest rate
policy allows the economy to respond to
shocks in a Pareto efficient manner. By
assumption, monetary policy cannot eliminate
the long-run impact of the information con-
straint, but it can improve welfare by smoothing
the fluctuations in this constraint.
Our results are stark because all firms in the
economy are subject to this hold-up problem.
One can imagine an environment in which
small firms are the ones most subject to agency
costs. This will change the quantitative—but
not the qualitative—predictions of the model.
This article uses a monetary model with
flexible nominal prices. In contrast, Bernanke
and Gertler (1999) analyze a similar question
in a model with sticky prices. They conclude
that as long as monetary policy responds
aggressively to inflation, there is no rationale
  8 For example, a positive nominal interest rate may be set to give
the government inflation-tax revenues.
  9 Optimal monetary policy refers to how the central bank should
change the interest rate in response to technology shocks and share
prices. Money growth is endogenous and, as discussed in the appendix,
can be backed out of the money demand relationship, that is, the cash-in-
advance constraint.
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for a direct response to asset prices. They
reach this conclusion because, in their model,
asset price shocks directly increase aggregate
demand and thus the price level. Hence, a
policy that responds aggressively to inflation
is automatically responding to asset prices. The
model described in this article creates no direct
link between inflation and asset prices, so
the central bank must respond directly to the
latter. It suggests that, to the extent that asset
prices do not immediately lead to price
inflation, there may be a role for a monetary
policy response to asset price movements.
Appendix 
The household’s maximization problem is
given by
1 1+ τ   Lt Max      E  βt ct – 
t=0 1
1+   τ         
s.t.    Mt–1+Xt +st–1qt+st Dt Pt




Rt–1Bt–1–Bt Mt –stqt –ct –      ≥0,
P t P t
where Bt denotes bond holdings (in zero net
supply), and households are assumed to receive






the beginning of the period (Mt
s denotes the
per capita money supply at time t). Notice that
the bond and tree markets open either simulta-
neous to or before the consumption market.
The first constraint is the cash-in-advance con-
straint: The cash remaining after leaving the
bond and tree markets is the cash that can be
used to purchase consumption. The second is
the intertemporal budget constraint. 
After minor simplification, household
optimization is defined by the binding cash
constraint and the following Euler equations: 
(A1) 1 = βRtEt(P t/P t+1)
Pt (A2) L 1 =wtβEt()
τ Pt+1
– st =  ifqt<qt
– st indeterminate ifqt=qt
– st =0 ifqt>qt, where
–– qt=Dt+Etβqt+1.
Substituting (A1) into (A2), we have
wt
τ
Lt =,    Rt 
which is equation (2) in the text. Along with
the equilibrium conditions given in the text,
we also have Bt = 0 and Mt
s =Mt . Since we
are following an interest rate policy, the
implied inflation behavior is given by (A1).
The supporting money growth process can
then be backed out of the binding cash- 
in-advance constraint.
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